This paper begins with a very brief review of the current status of offshore safety with particular reference to the UK sector. The risk-based verification concept is then described. Following identification of the research needs, a general risk-based verification framework is proposed with appropriate risk assessment contents incorporated into it. An example is then followed to demonstrate the proposed framework. The Health, Environment and Safety Information System (THESIS) software package is also used to facilitate the implementation of the framework. Finally, both the benefits and the limitations of risk-based verification in offshore applications are highlighted. The emphasis of the paper is focused on industrial applications.
Introduction
In response to the accepted findings of the Piper Alpha enquiry, Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations were introduced in the UK's offshore sector in 1993. An installation cannot legally operate without an accepted operational safety case. 1 The Safety Case Regulations were amended in 1996 to include verification of safety-critical elements (SCEs). The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations 1996 (DCRs 1996) were introduced to deal with various stages of the life cycle of the installation. 2 The duty holder (DH) (i.e. the operator of a fixed installation or the owner of a mobile installation) shall ensure that an installation at all times possesses such integrity as is reasonably practicable. 2 The DH shall also ensure that the installation is composed of materials which are suitable and, so far as is reasonably practicable, sufficiently proof against or protected from anything liable to prejudice its integrity. 2 The main feature of the new offshore safety regulations in the UK in particular, and worldwide in general, is the absence of a prescriptive regime defining specific duties of the operator and specification as regard to what are adequate means. 3 Proactive risk assessment processes have been used by the offshore industry in many countries worldwide. Different countries have their own regulatory regimes and often adopt different techniques although the tendency is to use a proactive risk-based approach.
Offshore safety regulations in many overseas countries have their own characteristics. For example, Brazil's regulations are largely dominated by Petrobras standards while in West Africa such regulations are heavily influenced by deep-water developments by British, American and African companies. Terms and definitions are used differently worldwide. For example, the UK and many EU countries accept the use of the term 'safety case' while the USA may prefer to use the term 'risk assessment'.
Risk-based verification (RBV) plays an important role in maintaining a required level of safety in the life cycle of an offshore installation. It provides a costeffective solution in facilitating a risk-based regime in the offshore industry. It can be used to help to implement offshore safety regulations through minimizing the resources and efforts available.
Fundamentals of verification
Verification and validation are often used in a mixed way in engineering design and operation. It is arguable to say that verification ensures that the system is designed to deliver all functionality to the user and it typically involves reviewing to evaluate documents, plans, code, requirements and specifications. Verification is usually carried out with checklists, issues lists, walkthroughs and inspection meetings. On the other hand, validation ensures that the defined functionality is the intended behaviour of the system; it typically involves actual testing and takes place after verifications are completed. However, in this paper, verification is used in a general way and is defined as a continuous and systematic process by which the predefined components of an asset are checked and examined to ensure that they conform to the standards which define their operability.
In the context of the offshore environment, verification of SCEs is required to be undertaken by the operator (i.e. a DH), for the life of an installation, from design and construction through to operation and ultimately decommissioning. SCEs are determined through hazard analysis and risk assessment.
Verification aims at providing a systematic and independent examination of the various life cycle phases of an asset to determine whether it satisfies the associated performance specification. It also aims at identifying errors or failures in the work associated with the asset and contributing to reducing the risks to the operation of the asset. It is not used to replace any statutory offshore safety requirements; instead it is complementary to them. It is highly possible that the verification process will duplicate some work that has been carried out previously by other parties involved in the asset or system. Verification is normally undertaken using a suitable written scheme called a verification scheme, which is put into effect to ensure that SCEs are suitable and remain in good repair and condition.
The traditional way of verifying the performance of an offshore system is prescriptive in nature. Prescriptive regulations specify rules of action that must be explicitly followed in order to comply with regulation. Possible issues associated with such a prescriptive method are as follows.
1. It is usually difficult to ensure the cost-effectiveness in a way that available resources are rationally allocated to areas with different risk levels. 2. It does not motivate or allow the DH to make use of the latest developments in technology to optimize safety in both design and operation. A prescriptive regime tends to encourage a passive attitude among the companies. The authorities become in some sense a guarantor to ensure that safety in the industry is adequate. 3. It usually conveys the minimum requirements for safe design and operation.
A risk-based approach has been used in hightechnology industries such as the aviation sector for many years. It has been increasingly used in the offshore industry in order to justify any decisions to be made in design and operation. A risk-based approach can achieve the following. 1 1. It can improve the performance of the system and ensure that new design and operation strategies are efficient. 2. It can ensure that experience obtained can be used in the current system and new systems. 3. It can provide a mechanism for predicting and controlling the high-risk scenarios with the available resources in a cost-effective way.
Definitions Independent competent person (ICP)
. This is a person (or body) appointed by the DH to act for a particular asset. The responsibilities of the ICP may include the following:
(a) reviewing and commenting on the SCEs; (b) reviewing the verification scheme to ensure that all mandatory elements required by the legislation have been included within the scheme; (c) providing comment on the performance standards established for the SCEs; (d) undertaking activities offshore and onshore as required by the verification scheme; (e) careful and critical scrutiny to determine compliance with the performance standards; (f) issuing all relevant reports and remedial action recommendations; (g) keeping the verification scheme under review.
The ICP will need to fulfil the following conditions:
1. It must be recognized as an organization providing this type of service. 2. It must have adequate resources to ensure that the requirements will be delivered on time and to the right quality. 3. It must have systems in place to manage the delivery of the verification scheme requirements.
Individuals employed as ICPs to perform activities under the scheme will be required to have the following:
(a) recognized qualifications and relevant experience relating to the SCE discipline; (b) demonstrable knowledge of the goal-setting legislative regime, major hazard management and appreciation of risk assessment techniques; (c) independence from the management system governing responsibility for carrying out actions of survey, inspection or test of items covered by the verification scheme; (d) no current or previous responsibility for any items that might compromise their objectivity in carrying out verification activities.
Performance standard. This defines the standards and measures of how something or someone must perform, typically in terms of functionality, availability, reliability, etc. It can be qualitative, quantitative or both in terms of the performance required of a system, an item of equipment, a person or a procedure. It could have been set for almost everything in the design. It can be used as the basis for managing hazards through the life cycle of the installation. Performance standards are generated for all SCEs identified and will provide assurance that SCEs are, and remain, suitable for their intended purpose. The standards must enable the SCEs to be verified as suitable and remaining in good repair and condition and thereby provide assurance that the level of safety set out in the safety case (i.e. risk assessment) will exist throughout the life cycle of the asset.
One or more key parameters are identified which, together, ensure that the individual goal of an SCE is achieved. Some are verified in design while others are verified by actual measurements. These actual measurements are the performance measures. Performance standards are initially established in the design phase of the development by competent persons within design. Subsequently, to ensure that the performance standards are maintained through the operations, a scheme of testing and inspection is developed and implemented to demonstrate that such standards would be achieved. The nature of such performance standards means that they will form part of the installation maintenance and inspection procedures for the systems concerned.
Safety critical elements (SCEs). These are defined as the systems, equipment and structural items that could result in, control or mitigate the effects of a major hazard. A definition of SCEs as given in the UK Safety Case Regulations states:
'Safety Critical Elements means such parts of the installation and such of its plant including programs, or any part thereof: the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or a purpose of which is to prevent, or limit the effect of, a major accident. ' SCEs are normally defined at a system level. Within the performance standards a further breakdown into specific subsystems is applied when considered necessary. SCEs relate to structure, plant, equipment, systems, etc., but they should exclude procedures or management systems.
In verification, the SCEs are checked and examined to ensure that they conform to the performance standards which define their operability. The verification scheme produced would have to, in order to be regarded as a suitable written scheme, give the following assurances:
(a) that the SCEs are suitable and fit for purpose; (b) that the SCEs remain in good repair and condition.
In this context, 'suitable' includes being appropriate for the intended use, being dependable and effective when required and being able to perform as intended. The verification scheme should provide independent checks to confirm continuing suitability throughout the installation's life cycle. It should take account of maintenance work, repairs and operating practices. The scheme is complementary to, but not a substitute for, routine maintenance programmes. A verification scheme would be expected to identify errors or failures in areas such as specification, selection of appropriate performance standards, design, construction or maintenance of elements which have been identified as safety critical, so that appropriate preventive or remedial action can be taken.
RBV developments
The topic of RBV has recently attracted much attention from both the academic community and the industrial sector. For example, a method has been formulated by Henningsson and Wohlin 4 to address how to select a suitable verification and validation process depending on the functionality being developed. The method describes how a suitable process is created and selected where the appropriate process is identified on the basis of functionality and coupling between the system entities being developed. Vik et al. 5 have developed another model to analyse the environmental hazard and risk of offshore chemicals used and discharged to the marine environment. BP and Landmark have identified desired improvements in testing, core competencies and independent verification. 6 Details of the audit process are included to enable other parties to conduct similar audits for themselves. The risks and potential loss imply that critical applications should be managed formally as safety-critical systems. Overall the concept of RBV has its wide application to the areas of real-time systems and software design. It has comparatively limited application in offshore design and operations. However, the concept of RBV has attracted much attention in the offshore industry. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) has developed an offshore service specification DNV-OSS-300 on risk-based verification. 7 In DNV's verification scheme, the principles of risk-based verification are described with the possible benefits highlighted. Lloyd's Register has developed a verification methodology for management of SCEs for offshore installations under the 1996 Amendments to the Safety Case Regulations 1992. 8 The methodology describes the verification scheme, SCEs, performance standards and verification scheme format. Safety-critical software verification is also included. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is also in the process of developing its own verification scheme. Many industrial offshore operators have developed their own RBV schemes with applications. For example, Pride North Sea UK Ltd has developed a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) verification scheme and applied it to those installations in the Pride North Atlantic. 9 Four Elements Ltd has developed a verification scheme with demonstration examples. 10 Transocean has developed a verification scheme for Sedco installations.
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The literature review indicates that there are similarities between all the verification schemes available. Some emphasize one specific technical issue in more depth than the others. In general, it seems that the RBV concept has not been formalized in a way that information flow in the scheme is based on risk assessment. In particular, the role of SCEs in RBV has been interpreted differently in SCE criticality assessment. The operational aspects have more emphasis compared with the design aspects. Furthermore, very limited software has been used to facilitate RBV. This paper addresses the above issues by providing a general RBV framework with the following specific new features: (a) a hierarchical asset definition proposed to allow hazard identification; (b) a step-by-step way of identifying major accident hazards for an offshore asset; (c) a progressive way of identifying SCEs and estimating their criticality; (d) definition of performance standards, identification of means of performance assurance and identification of means of verification with illustrative examples; (e) demonstration of the RBV framework's implementation through the use of a widely used software package.
Risk-based verification scheme
To improve the efficiency of the verification scheme, a risk-based process can be employed in which the outcome may cause resources and attention to be focused towards the high-risk areas. The risk associated with an asset or a system can be assessed in relation to different levels, and the verification process can be used to manage such risk. Through an RBV process, work effort and resources can be optimized, thus leading to improvements in the effectiveness. Clearly a risk assessment is the key in conducting RBV while the findings from the examination of quality management systems, documents and production activities are important. The major steps in an RBV scheme 12 are shown in Figure 1 , which will be described in detail below. The involvement 11 of the ICP in RBV is shown in Figure 2 , which is self-explanatory.
Step 1: definition of the asset hierarchy An asset may be a large system or a small component or feature. It can be an offshore installation, a system, a process or a development phase such as feasibility, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. In RBV of offshore installations, the first step is to define the asset hierarchy in which asset specification is made. This includes the following:
(a) detailed description of the asset in terms of functionality, capacity, operational requirements, etc.; such a description may need to be given at
Step 1 Definition of asset hierarchy
Step 2 MAH identification and screening
Step 3 Identification of SCEs
Step 4 Definition of performance standards
Step 5 Definition of means of performance assurance
Step 6 Assessment of criticality of SCEs
Step 7 Identification of means of verification
Step 8 Documentation of the verification arrangements
Step 9 Execution of verification scheme different indenture levels (i.e. system level, subsystem level, etc.); (b) identification of verification philosophy; (c) identification of codes and technical specifications to be used.
An asset hierarchy represents increased detail in describing the asset being studied for RBV. It shows how the systems and their associated subsystems work together in operations to provide the intended working function. It is worth stressing that an asset hierarchy should include both hardware and software systems, together with the management system in RBV. In particular, it should reflect both the structural and the process flow characteristics of the asset.
In general, an asset hierarchy has multiple hierarchical layers. At the top level, process flow diagrams need to be developed where typical systems include wells, process plant, emergency escape and rescue (EER) systems, etc., in an offshore installation. At the lower levels of the hierarchy, the breakdown of each system becomes more detailed. Eventually the breakdown stops at a required level of resolution where each system is reduced to a set of items that are interrelated to formulate a working system. An appropriate verification philosophy is defined in a way that the main features of the verification scheme are determined and the process for hazard management is organized. Various stages in the life cycle of the asset may need to be dealt with. Typical stages may include design, construction, operations and abandonment.
Appropriate national and international codes and technical specifications to be used in RBV need to be identified and complied with. Appropriate guides produced by the regulatory bodies may also need to be identified.
Step 2: major accident hazard identification and screening
The approach to system selection and setting of performance standards is to establish a clear link between the hazard, the risk and the appropriate risk-reducing measures. The risk-reducing measures can be control of release of a hazard as well as control of the consequences. This structured approach will make it easier to audit and review performance standards in the light of any future modifications or changes in circumstances or legislation.
The risk-based approach requires an initial riskranking exercise of the hazards identified in suitable studies. Using this approach allows the hazards considered comparatively trivial to be separated from the major hazards so that attention can be focused on the most significant hazards, hence achieving optimisation of the effectiveness of the related verification activities.
A hazard in the form of a major accident hazard (MAH) or major accident event (MAE) is typically considered as follows:
(a) fire, explosion or release of a dangerous substance involving death or serious personal injury to persons on board or engaged in an activity on board or in connection with it; (b) any event involving major damage to the structure of a vessel, installation or plant, or loss of vessel stability; (c) collision of a helicopter or a vessel with an installation; (d) any other event arising from a work activity involving death or serious personal injury to five or more persons on the vessel or engaged in an activity in connection with it.
Additionally such hazards or events can be considered from an environmental and health perspective such as pollution. Table 1 illustrates a typical listing of MAHs and MAEs.
The derivation of MAHs of an offshore installation is conducted through the following processes: A large offshore installation can be broken down into the platform, the export system, etc., which can be further broken down, if necessary, in order to identify possible hazards. The level of breakdown is dependent on the level at which SCEs are identified. Considering that SCEs are usually identified at the system level, the system breakdown for hazard identification is also kept at this level (i.e. temporary refuge (TR), marine riser, etc.).
Through hazard identification, a selected list of hazards specific to the problem under review is produced at an already defined level of system breakdown. Hazard identification uses a brainstorming technique involving a small group of experienced and suitably qualified personnel from various disciplines to determine the hazards.
Hazard screening. Figure 3 shows the development of a hazard and a series of consequences in the form of a 'bow tie'. From Figure 3 , it can be seen that an identified hazard can have several associated consequences. Such consequences are then studied to determine the initial risk profile of the hazard. The purpose of the hazard-screening process is to eliminate those hazards which have a low risk profile. Then it is possible to focus on those hazards with medium or high risks which would be developed further.
The concept of the initial risk profile illustrates that likelihood categories are considered irrespective of any particular controls or barriers that may be in place. Figure 4 illustrates a typical risk assessment matrix from The Health, Environment and Safety Information System (THESIS) 13 BowTie software in which a 5 3 6 risk matrix is shown. The matrix is applicable for people, assets, environment and reputation as defined on the left half of the figure. THESIS assists companies and operators in the analysis and management of the (major) hazards and risks to which their business is exposed and graphically displays the relationship between the hazards, the controls, the risk reduction measures and a business's health and safety activities. The software has been developed on the basis of the bow tie concept to display visually how hazards are controlled, and how the risks associated with them are reduced to be as low as reasonably practicable. As part of the process, performance standards can also be defined and managed.
The consequence severity of each identified consequence of a hazard can be classified as one of the six categories of severity S according to: S = 0 (no injury, no asset damage and no environmental pollution); S = 1 (slight injury, component damage and minor environmental pollution); S = 2 (minor injury, intermediate asset damage and intermediate environmental damage); S = 3 (major injury, major asset damage and major environmental pollution); S = 4 (single fatality or multiple major injuries, severe asset damage and severe environmental pollution); S = 5 (multiple fatalities, loss of asset and catastrophic environmental pollution).
The occurrence likelihood L of each identified consequence of a hazard can be described using one of six levels according to: Engineering judgement and past experience as well as the information in the risk assessment are required to carry out hazard identification and hazard screening. Figure 4 forms the basis of determining the risk levels of each consequence of an identified hazard based on the combined consequence severity and occurrence likelihood. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the risk associated with a consequence of a hazard could fall within one of the three risk categories: low, medium and high. The risk associated with a consequence of a hazard is determined by synthesizing the subrisks with respect to the people, asset and environment categories. The highest of such subrisks is assigned to the risk associated with the consequence of a hazard. For example, if the subrisks of a consequence of a risk are estimated as low, medium and high with respect to the people, asset and environment categories respectively, then the risk associated with such a consequence is given as high.
Once the risk associated with each consequence of a hazard is obtained, it is possible to determine the risk profile of the hazard. The rule to use is to assign the highest risk estimation of the constituent consequences to the risk associated with the hazard. For example, if a hazard has four identified consequences with their risks judged as low, low, medium and medium respectively, then the risk profile of the hazard is obtained as medium.
There are many other existing methods, such as cause-consequence analysis, that can be used to determine the risk levels of each consequence. Such methods may provide more detailed estimates of risks. However, a comparatively simple matrix method is sufficient for use in selecting MAHs.
Determination of the major accident hazards. Hazards classified as medium or high are identified as MAHs. Hazard identification and hazard screening can be conducted at any required level of detail within the asset hierarchy.
It is worth noting that the user can have the flexibility in defining categories for estimating the occurrence likelihood or consequence severity of a hazard, depending on the situation in hand. As a result, the risk assessment matrix could be 3 3 3, 4 3 4 or 5 3 5 in terms of possible combinations of both the occurrence likelihood and the consequence severity.
As will be seen, when estimating the safety criticality rating of SCEs within step 6, only three categories (high, medium and low) are used. 'High' corresponds to '4' and '5' used in Figure 4 , 'medium' to '2' and '3', and 'low' to '0' and '1'.
Step 3: identification of the safety-critical elements
In general, all the SCEs can be classified as follows in terms of their role in offshore operations:
(a) preventive SCEs; (b) mitigating SCEs.
Preventive SCEs are defined as those items of equipment or structures whose failure could lead to MAH(s) while the purpose of mitigating SCEs is to prevent or limit the consequences of MAH(s). In regard to safety management, SCEs are only associated with installation hardware and equipment-related software or logic systems and do not include safety-related management systems, processes and procedures.
To identify SCEs, each individual system is studied to see whether its failure will directly lead or contribute substantially to the occurrence of MAHs. The term 'contribute substantially to the occurrence of a major accident' is intended to include within the category of SCE those systems whose failure would not directly initiate a major accident but would make a significant contribution to a chain of events that could result in an MAH. If the purpose of a system is to prevent or limit the effect of an MAH, then it is also identified as an SCE. For example, failure of the lifting facility could result in a dropped object or load which is an MAH. As a result, the lifting facility is identified as an SCE. The evacuation system aims at preventing or limiting possible effects of a fire which is an MAH and therefore it is also identified as an SCE. It is usual to tag SCEs with unique identifying codes that can be recognized, for example, by maintenance management systems.
Step 4: definition of the performance standards
For each of the SCEs identified, the performance of the element or subelements will be considered and a performance standard will be set. When performance standards are qualitative, descriptive words for each element can be used. Where sufficient information is available for a quantitative performance standard to be set, then it can be readily incorporated. Where there is insufficient information to set a standard, draft performance standards should be proposed and reviewed with the ICP at an early stage, as soon as information becomes available following completion of any studies which may prove necessary.
The key to being able to set meaningful performance standards for a system or element is to have a clear and concise statement of the role of the system, based on an understanding of the suitability of the system for use in managing the specific hazard and knowledge of the range of applicability of the system concerned. These functional statements will be used as the foundation for defining the elements of the performance standards for the system.
It is essential that the engineer responsible for the development of the performance standards of SCEs has the necessary experience on the operations of the offshore installation or production unit being investigated in the RBV. Appropriate references may be needed to produce such performance standards. These include the following: The SCE's functionality, reliability and availability, survivability and interaction or dependence on other systems established should comply with standards referenced within the safety case or equivalent. However, the performance requirements in terms of infrequent failure probabilities (e.g. fewer than 1 3 10 26 per year) should usually be avoided, instead being replaced by a requirement for testing or inspection that will verify that such a performance can be expected.
1. Functionality. The performance standard regarding the functionality is developed in terms of the functional requirements and the performance criteria of an SCE. Both the functional requirements and the performance criteria are produced with respect to the risk assessment, safety justification and other guidance, classification rules, etc. Functional requirements define key functions to be carried out by the system in order to meet system goals. For example, the function requirements of the TR system are the provision of basic life-support conditions in respect of breathable air and ambient temperature conditions, the provision of sufficient access and egress points and routes to provide safe transfer of personnel to and from the TR and the provision of suitable systems during major incidents to enable emergency response personnel to communicate internally with the workforce and externally with outside bodies. The performance criteria are those which must be met by the function in order to achieve system goals. Such criteria must be measurable in terms of the hazard characteristics to be responded to, the area to be covered, the speed of response, the duration, etc. For example, the performance criteria regarding functionality for the TR system could be as follows: (a) AO steel construction; A60 fire walls facing the well and drill floor areas; (b) internal conditions (maximum temperature, 50°C; maximum carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentration, 20,000 ppm; maximum carbon monoxide (CO) concentration, 1200 ppm; maximum hydrogen sulphide (H 2 S) concentration, 20 ppm; maximum flammable gas, 50% lower explosive limit; thermal radiation from interior surfaces, 2 kW/m 2 ). (c) adequate thermal protection for personnel to muster safely at evacuation points (less than 2 kW/m 2 ).
(d) suitable communication systems for internal use (public announcement and radio links with fire team, etc.) and communications with relevant external bodies. 2. Reliability and availability. The performance criteria for the reliability and availability of an SCE are required to have availability to function on demand and to ensure that system goals are achieved. They can be either descriptive or quantitative. Such criteria are again produced with respect to the risk assessment, safety justification and other guidance (e.g. SOLAS), classification rules, etc. The performance criteria for the availability and reliability of the TR system are, for example, that the heating, ventilation and airconditioning (HVAC) system closes on demand, which is verified through monthly tests. 3. Survivability. Survivability defines the fire, explosion and accident event characteristics which each SCE must survive to ensure the performance of essential system functions. As appropriate, the time duration over which an SCE must survive may need to be defined. The hazardous event and performance criteria for survivability of an SCE can be defined using risk assessment, safety justification and other guidance. For example, the hazardous event and performance criteria for survivability of the TR system are to maintain integrity of all systems for the duration of an incident or until the evacuation of personnel takes place and to have a minimum TR endurance of 1 h. 4. Interaction with or dependence on other systems. In an offshore installation, an SCE may interact with other systems which provide essential support in ensuring the achievements of the SCE. The performance standard for interaction with or dependence on other systems of an SCE is defined in terms of the supporting or interactive systems and their interaction with and dependence on the SCE. For example, the systems that interact with the TR system include the following: the HVAC system, communications system, well control system, fire and gas system, ballast system, mooring system, propulsion system, evacuation system, escape system, life-saving equipment and emergency power systems.
In terms of their interaction with and dependence on the TR system, the HVAC system prevents ingress of smoke or gas into the TR, the communications system is required for use by emergency response team and for communication with outside bodies, the well control system provides control of well closure operations to prevent loss of containment from the well and/or reservoir, the fire and gas system provides detection of smoke and/or gas ingress to TR and initiates shutdown of HVAC to prevent loss of TR integrity, etc.
The information given in the interaction and dependence category of the performance standards provides an overview of how other systems influence the SCE. It is usually the case that other such systems are also SCEs for which performance standards have to be developed. There are no verification activities associated with interaction usually. Only if an identified interaction of an SCE changes, would any review be required. In the event that the change in interaction is adverse, then review by the management is required.
Step 5: identification of the means of performance assurance
The means of assuring the performance includes consideration of the activities contained in the systems used to manage risks, i.e. the safety management system and the preventive maintenance system. These systems contain activities that contribute to assuring the performances of SCEs such as the following:
(a) inspection, maintenance, testing routines, failure reports and operations procedures; (b) audits; (c) risk assessment studies.
As discussed previously, the bow tie methodology is able to capture the activities and tasks critical to the performance and maintenance of barriers. These tasks are considered as critical tasks and reflect the activities which support the performance standards and verification scheme. Key aspects of the performance standards and verification activities documents are as follows.
1. The documents show the visual examination, testing, review and audit requirements for action by the ICP to verify that the requirements of the performance standards are being met. 2. Actions relating to class and to flag state requirements, together with other requirements of the verification scheme are indicated in the mode column of the document, as follows: C: class requirement F: flag state requirement V: other verification requirement 3. The performance standards reference column links the activities to requirements in the performance standards for the following: P: performance criteria (including functional requirements if necessary) F: functionality RA: reliability and availability S: survivability
The means of performance assurance of an SCE is based on the performance standards produced. It is produced through visual examination, testing and review. All the three methods are described in columns of task reference number, task details, performance reference mode, frequency of examination, test and review, and performance standard reference.
1. Visual examination. Visual examination for assuring performance standards is produced through review of the class requirement, flag state requirement and other possible verification requirement. Possible tasks can be determined together with the frequency of each task. For example, for the TR system of an offshore installation, there could be three visual examination tasks: (a) confirm that suitable communication systems exist for internal public address and/or radio links with fire team, etc., and communication with relevant external bodies; (b) confirm that the following equipment and facilities have been provided to monitor and control incidents: fire and gas panel, HVAC, emergency shutdown of emergency shutdown, blow-out preventor, winch controls, and propulsion and ballast controls (main and secondary); (c) confirm that sufficient access and egress points and routes are provided to allow safe transfer of personnel to and from the TR system. All the three tasks should correspond to the operational requirements in the safety documentation. They address some elements of the performance standard relating to functionality of the TR system and they should be conducted on a yearly basis. 2. Test. Testing is usually undertaken during the design phase. During the operational phase, it is unusual to use testing to determine the means of performance assurance of the SCE. 3. Review. Review for assuring performance standards regarding the functionality, reliability and availability, and survivability is produced through review of the class requirement, flag state requirement and other possible verification requirements. Possible tasks can be determined together with the frequency of each task. Review could involve study of the design proposal, study of the design management system, study of the maintenance system and review of the system testing. For example, for the TR system of an offshore installation, there could be six visual examination tasks: (a) review the HVAC system testing to ensure that the system closes down automatically on smoke or gas detection at the inlets; (b) review the TR system information for confirmation of the structure and fire protection to ensure integrity against fire and blast consequences shown in the safety statement; (c) confirm that the TR is constructed in suitable materials, with suitable protection facing the well and drill floor areas; (d) confirm that adequate thermal protection has been provided to allow personnel to muster safely at evacuation points; (e) design review to confirm the minimum endurance of the TR; (f) review the planned maintenance system and the previous records to ensure that the level of maintenance is acceptable; it is necessary to have a 100% review of maintenance and inspection records over a 2 year period, i.e. nominally, 50% per year. All the six tasks correspond to the operational requirement in the safety statements or case. They address the remaining elements of the performance standard relating to the functionality, the reliability and availability, and the survivability of the TR system.
Where required, the ICP will issue remedial action recommendations which will be referenced on the log sheet.
Step 6: assessment of criticality
The definition of an SCE is based on the severity of possible consequences and the role that it plays in hazard management should there be a failure of that element. Therefore, to provide an RBV scheme, the concept of safety criticality is introduced. This recognizes that all elements defined as safety critical will not necessarily be equally critical. The more severe the possible consequences and the more important the role the SCE plays in hazard management, the greater is the safety criticality of that element.
SCEs can thus be ranked according to the degree of safety criticality associated with them. The purpose of estimating safety criticality is to provide an input to the asset's verification scheme to ensure that the means of verification applied through maintenance and inspection are based on the significance of the MAHs and the role of the SCEs in contributing to risk reduction.
These verification arrangements include the following:
(a) the means of performance assurance and reassurance; (b) the frequency of verification tasks and methods used for verification; (c) appropriate allocation of resources that is given to SCEs with different safety criticality ratings; (d) the extent of demonstration that the level of verification is adequate.
Based on the role that an SCE fulfils and the severity of the possible consequences caused by the occurrence of the SCE, the safety criticality of an individual SCE can be established. This is then applied to develop the requirement for verification. The process for assessing the safety criticality of an SCE is described as follows.
Identify the hazard management rating. The hazard management rating (HMR) is used to measure the role that SCEs play in hazard management. An example of an HMR system based on the role of the SCE is shown in Table 2 .
Identify the consequence rating. The consequence rating (CR) is used to measure the severity of the possible consequences should an SCE fail. The method used to identify the CR is a three-tier system based on the contribution of each MAH to the consequence severity levels, as shown in Table 3 . The CR of the possible consequences of an SCE is described in terms of its contribution to the injuries and fatalities, asset damage or environmental damage.
Identify the safety criticality rating. With the CR and HMR identified, the safety criticality of the identified SCEs is then established using the criticality matrix, as shown in Table 4 .
When determining the safety criticality of an SCE using Table 4 , it is necessary to investigate all the possible combinations of the CR and HMR ratings. It is possible that more than one safety criticality value for an SCE would be generated. In such a case the highest safety criticality value is chosen for the SCE. For example, a particular SCE with a medium rating for HMR and with CR values of high, medium and low for personnel, asset and environment respectively will have three safety criticality values of high, medium and low. A safety criticality rating of high should be assigned to this SCE.
Those SCEs with identical overall safety criticality ratings may also be further differentiated. For example, suppose that we have the following assumptions.
1. SCE 1 has a safety criticality rating of high across all the three consequence categories. 2. SCE 2 has safety criticality ratings of high, high and low across the three consequence categories. 3. SCE 3 has safety criticality ratings of high, medium and low across the three consequence categories.
In this instance, SCE 1 is regarded as the most critical SCE.
Risk assessment of the performance standards. As a further iteration of risk analysis, an option is available to carry out risk assessment of the performance standards. This option would depend on the need for detailed analysis and also the availability of data on hand for use in such an assessment.
The performance standards of an SCE in terms of the functionality, the reliability and availability, and the survivability can be documented. Each performance standard of the SCE on the functionality, the reliability and availability, and the survivability can be modelled in terms of their risk levels using the following two parameters:
(a) the likelihood L that the performance standard is violated;
(b) the severity S of possible consequences given violation of the performance standard.
Engineering judgement and past experience, as well as information from the risk assessment, may be required to estimate the above two parameters of an SCE. Then the risk levels associated with each performance standard of the SCE can be estimated. Suppose that the following information is obtained for the performance standards of an SCE in terms of the functionality, the reliability and availability, and the survivability: The measure of environmental pollution is dependent upon the material that is discharged and the sensitivity of the location under consideration. Coastal state requirements will need to be consulted in setting these thresholds. From the above it can be seen that the risk associated with the performance standard of the SCE in terms of the functionality is the highest. As a result the performance standard of the SCE on the functionality is considered as the most important among the performance standards of an SCE in terms of the functionality, the reliability and availability, and the survivability.
Through such a risk assessment, the risk-based performance standards can be produced. Effort expended in the development of performance verification activities should be proportionate to the level of risk estimated. For example, within an SCE, a performance standard with a high risk would need to have more carefully designed verification activities in comparison with a performance standard with a low risk.
Step 7: identification of the means of verification
The means of verification in design and construction. Guidance on how the means of verification may be implemented in design and construction is illustrated in Table 5 subject to the following: (a) review and agreement with the appointed ICP; (b) review based on the previous performance of similar SCEs.
The means of verification for operations. Guidance on how the means of verification may be implemented in operations is illustrated in Table 6 subject to the following:
(a) review and agreement with the appointed ICP; (b) review based on the SCE's previous performance.
Step
8: documentation of the verification arrangements
The SCEs, performance standards, means of performance assurance and arrangement for verification are to be documented in an individual verification scheme for the asset. The verification scheme is reviewed by the appointed ICP, in accordance with the coastal state regulations. The purpose of this review is for the ICP to identify any shortfalls or omissions in the list of SCEs and to assess the suitability of the verification scheme and associated documentation. On the basis of the performance standards set for each SCE, written schemes of verification are prepared. These written schemes will be drafted with the necessary scheme detail and examination details (for initial and periodic examinations), to provide the DH with a practical set of written schemes.
Step 9: execution of the verification scheme
The DH is responsible for appointing the ICP to operate and review the verification scheme, to carry out the verification tasks under the scheme and, where necessary, to revise the scheme.
An illustrative example
To be able to demonstrate the described RBV procedure, a simplified example is used. Considering the large number of SCEs associated with an offshore installation, it is not feasible to demonstrate the described RBV procedure using a whole platform. In order not to lose generality, a generic jack-up offshore installation is used in which the functions, features, characteristics and attributes common to all installations of different types are described. For demonstration purposes, a relatively higher level of breakdown is utilized. This example is presented in parallel with the RBV scheme described above.
Definition of the asset hierarchy
The example used is a large heavy-duty jack-up platform. The platform is a self-elevating fully integrated drilling, production and quarters platform. The main elements of the structure are a triangular hull. The connections between the hull and the legs are by jacking and locking systems located in jack houses and locking rooms at the corners. Internally it is divided into two levels. The machinery deck is the bottom level, immediately above the double bottom. The platform control room and offices are on the main deck level. This entire level of the accommodation block is the platform TR with its own integral HVAC system. The topside structure sits on the gravity base tank (GBT), a reinforced concrete structure which provides the foundation. The verification philosophy of the asset can be identified. In this case study, the verification scheme is organized for the operational stage only. The facilities and means of operation relating to this installation were developed to comply fully with the DCRs and Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulations. The means of establishing and maintaining all aspects of the installation critical to safety is achieved through a formalized auditable process of safety integrity. The integrity of the installation's SCEs is maintained on a 'live' basis by a formal rigorous integrity assurance process, to ensure that the risks to the personnel, the assets and the environment are maintained at a level that is as low as reasonably practicable throughout the operating life of the installation.
Major accident hazards and screening
Through a structured auditable approach, MAHs on the offshore installation can be placed in one of the categories described in Table 1 . The possible consequences of such MAHs include human deaths and/or injuries, asset damage and environmental damage. At the defined system breakdown level, each individual system (i.e. crane lifting equipment) is investigated through a hazard identification session.
Each identified hazard can be estimated with respect to the associated consequences in terms of the consequence severity and the occurrence likelihood shown in Figure 4 . Then those judged with a low-risk profile can be screened out for further analysis although they should be kept within the low-risk region throughout offshore operations.
Identification of the safety-critical elements
The identification of SCEs is here conducted at the defined level of system breakdown. The possible MAHs can be found in Table 1 . Then the SCEs of the offshore installation can be identified through investigating possible links between the constituent systems and the identified MAHs. Table 7 shows examples of some registered SCEs of this offshore installation at the system level. Alternatively the SCEs can also be identified through the design and operations safety cases (i.e. risk assessment) of the installation.
Definition of the performance standards
For demonstration purposes, only the HVAC system (general SCE 3) is considered for detailed study. Its performance standards are defined as shown in Table 8 .
Identification of the means of performance assurance
The means of performance assurance for the HVAC system is shown in Table 9 .
Assessment of the criticality
For the HVAC system, the ratings obtained are: HMR = medium CR for personnel = high CR for asset = high CR for environment = low This yields the safety criticality ratings:
Safety criticality rating for personnel = high Safety criticality rating for asset = high Safety criticality rating for environment = low
The highest rating, namely high, is then chosen as the overall safety criticality rating of the HVAC system.
Identification of the means of verification
From the obtained criticality rating of the HVAC system and also from the guidance in Table 9 , the means of verification can be given as follows.
1. For the ICP, it is necessary to have 100% witnessing of inspections and testing, as appropriate over a 4 year period, i.e. nominally 25% per year. For equipment with a single unit test, testing would be witnessed annually. 2. For document review, it is necessary to have a 100% review of maintenance and inspection records over a 1-2 year period, i.e. nominally 100% or 50% per year depending on the extent of records.
Documentation of the verification results
The HVAC system, its performance standards, the means of performance assurance and the arrangement for verification can then be documented. A review of these can be conducted by the appointed ICP.
Execution of the verification scheme
The verification scheme can be executed for the other identified SCEs by following the analysis described in the above sections on definition of the performance standards, on identification of the means of performance assurance, on assessment of the criticality, on identification of the means of verification and on documentation of the verification results. The verification scheme will then be reviewed, utilizing the experience gained.
Implementation of RBV using THESIS
The hazard modelling and safety information management features of THESIS can be used for implementing the proposed RBV scheme of offshore installations. In the following, THESIS is used to facilitate the RBV of the example presented above.
Step 1: definition of the asset hierarchy From Figure 5 , it can be seen that the offshore installation is broken down into the platform, the GBT and the export system. It is also possible to break down the hierarchy further to allow effective hazard identification if necessary. The case information can be given using the window shown in Figure 5 .
Under each of those categories of the platform, the GBT and the export system, hazard identification can be conducted, and the identified hazards are recorded using THESIS. Figure 6 shows how the identified hazards are recorded. On the left-hand side of Figure 6 , it can be seen that all the identified hazards are listed, where their associated consequences, threats and barriers can also be recorded. The right-hand side of Figure 6 gives a bow tie diagram of a highlighted hazard. For example, the selected hazard 'Minor leak of the sea water system in the utility systems' shown in Figure 6 has two possible consequences: 'Reducing operation efficiency' and 'Causing discomfort in the working environment'. There are also two threats leading to the identified hazard. These are 'Not tight sealing in pipe connections' and 'Minor leakage of pumps'. Each identified consequence associated with the hazard can be assessed using the risk matrix approach shown in Figure 4 . Figure 7 gives an example of risk assessment of the hazard 'Reducing operation efficiency' associated with 'Minor leak of the sea water system in the utility systems'. Through such an analysis, Review planned maintenance system records to ensure that the level of maintenance is acceptable V 12 P: F/RA/S
The above activities will be completed with reference to the required performance standards and the ICP surveyor will make an entry into the associated log sheet. Where required, the ICP surveyor will issue remedial action recommendations which will be referenced on the log sheet. the risk profile associated with each identified hazard is produced. For example, from Figure 8 it can be seen that the subrisks associated with 'Reducing operation efficiency' with respect to the people, environment and asset categories are low (C 3 1), low (C 3 2) and low (C 3 1). The risk record of the hazard 'Minor leak of the sea water system in the utility systems' is also shown in Figure 8 (i.e. in the 'Ranking' box). Both the operator and the ICP can then sign off the identified hazard and its assessment using the 'Completed and Signed Off' window shown in Figure 8 . Those hazards classified as high or medium are identified as MAHs.
Step 3: identification of SCEs
Each individual system in the categories of the platform, GBT and export system is then investigated to see whether its failure would result in the occurrence of any identified MAHs or whether its purpose is to prevent or limit the consequences of any identified MAHs. Figure 9 lists some typical SCEs of the offshore installation being investigated. Such associated MAHs and possible consequences caused by the failure of each SCE can be presented in a form of a bow tie. An example is shown in Figure 10 where the associated MAHs and possible consequences of SCE 3 (i.e. the HVAC system) are given. It is necessary to redefine appropriate terms in THESIS when using it for implementing RBV of offshore installations. The flexibility of redefining technical terms in THESIS allows the user to employ their own preferred terminology in RBV of offshore installations.
Step 4: the performance standards
The performance standards of each identified SCE are defined in terms of the functionality, the reliability and availability, the survivability and the interaction with and dependence on other systems. Such performance standards can be presented using THESIS. The performance standards of the HVAC system in terms of the functionality, the reliability and availability, the survivability and the interaction with and dependence on other systems are shown in Figures 11 to 14.
Step 5: the means of performance assurance
The means of performance assurance for each SCE can be described using THESIS. Figure 15 gives a THESIS window for describing the means of performance assurance of each SCE. Figure 16 demonstrates how the GBT: gravity base tank.
means of performance assurance for the HVAC system is presented in a THESIS window in terms of visual examination.
Step 6: the criticality of SCEs
The criticality rating of each SCE can be estimated using the approach described in the section on the assessment of criticality. Then it can be input into the THESIS-based RBV system. The criticality rating of the HVAC system is shown in Figure 17 (i.e. in the 'Ranking' box).
Step 7: the means of verification
The means of verification of each SCE can be appropriately identified using the obtained criticality rating and the information in Table 5 . It can then be managed using THESIS. For example, the means of verification of the HVAC system with respect to visual examination is shown in Figure 16 .
Step 8: documentation of the verification arrangements
The information on the identified SCEs, their performance standards, the means of performance assurance and the arrangements for verification can be documented in THESIS as shown above. As soon as the RBV is completed for a selected SCE, the SCE can be in an 'Assigned' status, as shown in Figure 18 .
Step 9: execution of the verification scheme RBV of any offshore installation can be executed by following the above steps. Any feedback from the experience can be fed into the THESIS-based RBV system. The RBV record incorporating THESIS is a 'live' management system for which any necessary changes can be made during the offshore design and operation and any record of change can be kept.
Conclusions
RBV can appropriately ensure using available resources in a balanced way to control the risks throughout the life cycle of an asset. In principle, through focusing on high-risk elements and prioritizing verification efforts it should provide both time and cost savings compared with the traditional prescriptive verification or certification regime. Through use of formal hazard identification and risk assessment methods, RBV may give substantial cost 
294
Proc IMechE Part M: J Engineering for the Maritime Environment 226(3) Figure 14 . Performance standard of the HVAC system in terms of interaction with and dependence on other systems.
RBV: risk-based verification; SCE: safety-critical element; MAH: major accident hazard; HVAC: heating, ventilation and air conditioning; PS: performance standard; TR: temporary refuge; n/a: not applicable. benefit while keeping the overall risk within an acceptable level during the verification process. This may be particularly true for systems with a high level of complexity, new technologies and new design and operation features. This possible benefit can be mutual to both verification bodies and customers in terms of reduced or controlled risks. A possible limitation could be that all parties involved in the verification process need to make the effort and time to become familiar with the scheme. Another limitation may be that a high level of uncertainty in data or lack of data could make it difficult for risk assessment to be conducted where appropriate subjective judgements are often necessary. This certainly requires the ICP to be knowledgeable in the areas of verification.
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that any developed risk-based scheme should preferably be introduced into a commercially stable environment in order that the application has the chance to become established to prove feasible; otherwise it is more likely that its full potential will not be realized.
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